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Abstract – This work is focused on attacks on confidentiality that 
require time synchronization. This manuscript proposes a 
detection framework for covert channel perspective in cloud 
security. This problem is interpreted as a binary classification 
problem and the algorithm proposed is based on certain features 
that emerged after data analysis of Google cluster trace that forms 
base for analyzing attack free data. This approach can be 
generalized to study the flow of other systems and fault detection. 
The detection framework proposed does not make assumptions 
pertaining to data distribution as a whole making it suitable to 
meet cloud dynamism. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Data loss and theft are both major lurking threats to the cloud and 
most of the times the way a threat is handled can exacerbate the 
other by exposing multiple copies of data to risk. Data breach is 
usually a result of intrusive action that went unnoticed. Present state 
of the art(about data handling in cloud refer to [7][8]) does 
guarantee a minimal protection from theft by preventing and 
detecting intrusion. But any new attack which has distribution 
similar to the regular events is hard to be noticed. Having said that 
certain unsupervised techniques may be able to capture or log such 
event pattern which is not usual. Covert channel attack are such 
attacks which not only leak sensitive data but remain hidden from 
detection, situation being amplified by the fact that cloud hosts 
multiple tenants which can be adversary of one another. Cloud thus 
provides many avenues of data leak where hypervisor and VM 
security itself is questionable. In this manuscript we discuss covert 
channel detection, which in itself is a uphill task given the current 
state of technology relies on machine learning for anomaly 
detection. Besides each attack have its own novelty and an ects  di 
erent parameters of the system. This is unsurprisingly true for 
covert channel attacks as well. Some channels exploit cache, disk, 
bus, memory and many more shared channels can be exploited for 
the same. Certain applications like online games can be used for 
collusion by choosing different move other than the best one [3]. 
Covert channels have been studied for a long time and found to be 
non preventable but still may be detectable. No infallible method to  
 
detect exists so far, fact brought out by literature review 
[1],[4]. 
The method that we propose is based on statistical 
characteristics of the data. During the analysis of Google 
cluster trace data based on time of resource request, 
intervals and access latency parameters. Data collected from 
our cloud testbed after simulating covert channel attacks 
was also analysed and there were some interesting 
observations which are discussed in next section. These 
observations formed the base of our detection framework. 
The contributions of this paper are: It perceives the issue of 
covert channel detection in cloud as a problem of binary 
classification. It gives certain new observations to enable 
classification of normal and attack data. A new variable is 
proposed that potentially serves as an initial threshold for 
classification framework. A framework for covert channel 
detection is proposed in cloud and lastly we validate our 
results by comparing with previous approach in literature. 
Last section provides empirical evidence [6]. 
 
 
II. COVERT CHANNEL HIDE AND SEEK 
We make an assumption that if an event is not part of an 
attack then it will be i.i.d that is a random variable will have 
same probability distribution as others and are mutually 
independent. Let us have a time series of requests that were 
made for shared resources, if the requests are timed to create 
a covert channel then it will not be independent of each 
other, moreover an IID sequence(independent and 
identically distributed) does not imply the probabilities for 
all elements of the event space must be the same. Thus we 
believe that any time based attack will have time 
dependency in sequencing the events. Thus we filter out all 
such sequences.  
Algorithm:  
1) Collect data of time of request for shared resource:  
(This can be done by placing a hook code in 
hypervisor)  
         2) In the time series data we calculate will be of the 
form   x2 = x1 + t : 
 
3) Here both x1 and t are random variables; so by 
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theorem1 x2 is a random variable. Thus if x2 is iid sequence, then 
data is normal signifying no attack: 
 
4) Else forward it to classification sub algorithm: 
 
In step three we try to filter input data so as to take only the set 
of data which has any probability of attack. This reduces the time 
complexity of classification and accuracy is gained. The data will 
be checked for zero auto correlation on time, signaling its iid 
property. There are two components of the proposed framework. 
One is o ine processing (step 2-3) and the other one is active 
processing (step 4). After obtaining the time series, we preprocess 
the data to avoid irrelevant results. We normalize the data to speed 
up the active processing and we obtain first order di erence of data 
to enable pattern availability. Though the order will depend on the 
source and environment from which data is being obtained, we 
were able to obtain the pattern with first order. 
 
Dynamic systems have certain characteristics which we exploit 
in this manuscript. We obtain time series data which signifies 
request time and interval of request. Thus f (x) = x + x . It would be 
a good idea to specify a theorem pertaining to random variables. 
This theorem gives an important result that sum of 2 random 
variables will be random. Theorem1 : Let X and Y be 2 
independent random variables with density functions fx(x) and 
fy(y) defined for all x. Then the sum z = x + y is a random variable 
with density function fz(z) where fz is convolution of fx and fy. 
 
III. DETERMINING CLASSIFYING VARIABLES-THE 
DECISION RULE 
 
Research begins with identification of distinguishing variables. 
Various measurable criterias for Inter VM tra c filtering can be: 
Delay times (inter request time), shape of tra c , individual request 
sizes request sizes , duration of resource usage, request regularity 
etc [2]. For time based attacks first natural choice would be to 
analyze the time operations and intervals of time of resource 
request. The charts below give a brief idea of the o ine process of 
variable identification for detection. The first order di erence gives 
vivid idea of the behavior di erence of time intervals of requesting 
resource. Following observations can be made: One is the intervals 
are regular in attack while random element in normal operations 
data. The source of normal request data is Google cloud trace[5]. 
The second observation is that normal requests come in bursts and 
behavior is spiky as contrast to attack behavior. [Figure: 1] 
 
Also for in-depth study of the parameters, Euclidean distance 
between 2 points is calculated and plotted as shown in [Figure: 2]. 
this makes the behavior more vivid by another factor. This 
observation leads to an important conclusion that we cannot apply 
density based algorithms for detection as they assume attacks are 
scarce. One important goal for any decision rule is the property of 
generalization, which is an important property in the field of 
learning. For this purpose it is required to have an approximation 
function representing the distribution of the variable. To enable 
generalization we do not pre-assume any distribution. 
 
IV. PROPOSED HYPERDIMENSION DETECTION  
This section discusses only the core classification 
mechanism of classifying data. As it is very complex to find 
out the distribution of data in cloud, we use non parametric 
approach. Also because output of a dynamical system 
depends on all previous inputs, it is very complex to use an 
unsupervised method for the purpose. Non parametric 
approach does not assume that the structure of a model is 
fixed and it may grow to accommodate the complexity of 
the data. Individual variables are typically assumed to 
belong to parametric distributions, and assumptions about 
the types of connections among variables are also made. 
Thus we look at the distribution structure of the resource 
request time variable [Figure: 3, 4]. 
The approximation function uses method of least squares 
provides good approximation for the variable. The [figure: 
5] gives Classification Sub algorithm. 
 
4.1. Implementation 
 
Step 1: 
By fitting the data we obtain a row vector  with certain 0 
coefficients. 
 
   x
6
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4
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3
+536x+908 (1) 
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+4135x+6626(2)                                                                        
 
 
 
Step 2:  
After obtaining mathematical equations that is define 
normal and attack behavior based on resource request time. 
It is important to define threshold values that can be used 
for comparison. Here normal behavior so obtained will be 
treated as our threshold.  
Distance vector is calculated by subtracting eqn1 from eqn2. 
 
2x
7
+31x
6
+371x
5
+2729x
4
+1863x
3
+8836x
2
+4671x+5718(3) 
 
Important Observation: 
One point worth mention is that the equation figure 
attackvector [Figure: 6]. This validates Another observation 
about attack data is that obtained for attack behavior is a 
monotonic function as represented in our results as the same 
observations were made by other researchers. high 
autocorrelation(r) was observed. Values of r were close to 1. 
 
 
V. EVALUATION AND EMPERICAL VALIDATION 
Previous approaches that were successfully used in 
traditional setup for covert channel detection like standard 
deviation, entropy based approaches were experimented but 
those did not go well in cloud based attacks in our ex-
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periments. The probable reason for that could be that in cloud so 
many processes are running at same time and optimization 
algorithms try to use available resources to the best, leading to less 
chances of accurate entropy measure-ment for a single process 
along with smarter attack algorithms which tend to blend in 
resource requests by neutralizing entropy. 
We tested our algorithm on a separate dataset and applied our 
algorithm. The results are shown in figures below. Also to check 
monotonicity, we obtained a function using curvefitting. After 
performing this step there were 0 false negatives while around 20 
percent false positives. To bring this down next will check the data 
for monotonicity.  
The figure [ 9] contains two parts first one contains a monotonic 
function signifying attack while in the second part graph dip 
signifies normal data behave. The statistical profile of the algorithm 
performance is given in the table below [table: 10]. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Though it is not easy to proof the cloud of all security breaches 
but as current research is focused on bringing thefts under 
acceptable limits, authors plan to contribute by taking detection of 
covert channel further to self-correction mechanism so that instead 
of logging the system should be able to restore and recover from the 
attack. Besides as a step further towards generalization, in near 
future authors plan to propose a framework for anomaly detection 
in cloud. 
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 For each individual value V in forwarded datadet D: 
- Calculate Euclidean distance.   
- Obtain first order series of request time.   
 Obtain approximation function for the series(f). 
 Calculate autocorrelation(r) and move to next step; 
 If r >=0.6  
(this threshold will ensure there are no false negatives) * Move to next step  
Else Print(“Take larger interval,not likely to be an attack”)  
 If (f is a differentiable continuous function in large interval (a,b)) Calculate:  
* if f’(x) > 0 for x in (a,b) then f is increasing  
 
* if f’(x) < 0 for x in (a,b) then f is decreasing Else Print(“Not likely to be an attack”)  
 
Figure 5: Classification algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3:Curvefitting 
Figure4:Curvefitting 
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Figure 8: Autocorrelation for validation 
Figure 6 :  validation 
Figure 7: Autocorrelation for validation 
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Channels False False False Negatives(c2 False 
 Positives(C2 Positives(Detection detector) Negatives(Detection 
 detector) Engine)  Engine) 
CPU load 4.46% 2.28% Nil Nil 
based     
Memory Bus --- 3% Nil Nil 
attack     
     
Cache Based 1.89 1% Nil Nil 
attack     
 Figure 10 :  Comparison 
 Figure 9 : Function Behaviour 
